WHAT'S WRONG WITH DEATH?

By Max O'Connor [Editor: This article is reprinted from Extropy #4 - Summer Issue, 1989 . Extropy was published by The Extropy Institute] 

A central extropian value is the love of life and opposition to death. Death is seen as an enemy that destroys personality, value, information (in the brain), and all possibility of further growth in personal knowledge, wisdom, power, and experience. This is very clear to me and fellow immortalists, yet most people go to great lengths to find arguments that show death to be good, or at least unobjectionable. I have come across a variety of these arguments, and the purpose of this article is to refute them. Though the discussion should really include reasons to find the prospect of immortality thrilling, that will have to wait for another time.

Death and the relief of pain

Death is one of the worst possible things that could happen to you. Perhaps we can imagine fantasy situations that we might consider worse than death. For instance, if someone told me, and I knew beyond all doubt that they were telling the truth, that I would be tortured relentlessly for 50 years and then completely destroyed with no chance for recovery, I might rationally choose to die now rather than endure such suffering. However, if I were to be tortured for a while and then freed, or had even a reasonable possibility of being freed, I would prefer to live, especially considering the potential for unending life due to future biomedical technology. Certainly, in any remotely foreseeable circumstances, death would be something I would resist and resent.

It's true that, given my human weakness, I might choose death rather than suffer great and enduring pain. But this would not be because death was better; it would only be because I couldn't bear any more of the pain. This is not to say that I necessarily would choose continued life because, in that situation, my thinking could be clouded by pain, and I might be unable to think of anything other than stopping the pain. Yet, if I expected this to occur and could do so, I would prevent myself from ending my life at that time (perhaps by persuading someone to stop me and to ignore whatever I said to them then, or by other means).

If I were ignorant of cryonics and the possibility of later healthy revival, it might be rational for me to choose death over a protracted terminal illness. However, I know that "terminal illnesses" may not really be terminal but just temporary.

Some might object that my choice of death over painful experiences indicates that death is my true preference. They would argue that I am simply imposing my present preferences on those of my future self.(1)

As appealing as this view might seem at first, it appears to lack coherence when considering preferences and 'real wants' in terms of the identity of the agent generating them. If we distinguish momentary urges from desires that genuinely represent an individual, we might acknowledge that one can have reasons to do things that they don't currently want to do. 'Wants' simply represent action tendencies; they are the objectives toward which one's actions are inclined. However, it might not necessarily be the individual consciously pushing for these actions or choices. Humans are not singularly unified entities but rather complex beings. The brain comprises numerous subunits, each programmed for specific tasks—some highly specific, others more abstract.

One such subsystem may intervene to urge actions like eating, drinking, sleeping, seeking sexual gratification, or companionship. For evolutionary reasons, we possess a potent subsystem that prompts us to alleviate pain. When experiencing severe pain, this subsystem urges us to halt the pain at any cost. In a scenario where the choice is between immediate death or an extended but finite period of intense pain followed by a return to normalcy, our anti-pain subsystem might override all other cognitive processes and considerations to stop the pain. Consequently, it may seem impossible for me or anyone else in such a situation to choose anything other than instant death if that appears to be the only way to end the pain.

However, the fact (if true) that one might opt for death over immense pain does not prescribe any rational or metaphysical 'should.' The reasons to act are rooted in one's identity as an agent, in what defines them: their perspectives, values, attachments, and commitments. These reasons for action may not necessarily align with the momentary desires imposed by their subsystems. Your preferences are not those dictated solely by 'evolution' (here, I use 'evolution' as a descriptive term for the process of variation and selection in the gene-pool and not as a conscious entity). Hence, in the choice between instant death or temporary extreme pain, an evolutionarily-predisposed subsystem may compel one to do something that they—the true, complete individual—would not inherently desire.

For those who do not believe in the possibility of physical immortality or significantly extended life, the rational trade-off between pain and a longer life will differ. If one does not anticipate living beyond a few years after recovery, enduring intense pain might seem to offer insufficient rewards to justify the struggle. The anticipated duration or hope of enjoying life plays a crucial role in determining the rational threshold of pain one might endure.

Therefore, my argument does not imply that it's always incorrect to choose death; rather, it suggests that death, particularly for the immortalist or those embracing the prospect of extended life, is almost always the worst possible outcome. Consequently, death could be the circumstance one has the most compelling reason to avoid, even if currently, the desire for it surpasses that of enduring a painful alternative.

Perspectives on death

When I express that death, to me, would be (virtually) always the worst evil, I am not referring to "death" in the abstract. It's not because death is universally bad that it must be bad for me specifically. That is indeed a part of it. The demise of other beings, especially humans, and particularly those to whom I have strong attachments, triggers negative reactions within me. Therefore, it's natural that contemplating my own death evokes a sense of dislike and displeasure.

The demise of others signifies the loss of values. In this sense, my own death appears bad from this abstract perspective. However, this is only a minor aspect of why I perceive my own death as undesirable. I cannot equate my own death with the deaths of other people. These two things aren't even comparable.

Why is this distinction important? Whenever I encounter or learn about death, it always concerns the expiration of organisms in my surroundings—death from my viewpoint. This is fundamentally distinct from my personal death, which signifies the end of my perspective. The passing of all others occurs externally within my experience, whereas my death signifies the termination of my perspective on reality. It marks the conclusion of all experiencing, including experiencing death itself.

The passing of people and organisms I value implies a loss of something meaningful. I lose the opportunity to interact, enjoy, and learn from them. However, in my own death, from my subjective viewpoint, all possibilities of value and enjoyment are extinguished. The annihilation of my point of view represents the subjective annihilation of all reality.

The "deathist" is someone who advocates for death in the sense that they believe death has its rightful place, and life should not continue beyond a certain point. When the deathist argues that their death does not matter and that they have no reason to prolong their life or seek the abolition of death through science, they make the mistake of perceiving their death objectively. They look at their death as if it were just like that of anyone else's. I attempted to explain earlier why I believe this to be a mistake.

In claiming that their death does not matter, the deathist assumes a perspective that is not their own. They step outside of themselves, outside of their identity in an imaginative sense, and assert that their death is no different from the death of anyone else. However, of course, it is different! Their view is only tenable by focusing on the perspective of nature as a whole (or humanity or living things as a whole). But I am not nature, and I am not all living things. I am ME, this specific perspective on reality. I am a distinct cognitive system that serves as a center of experience. All I perceive of reality is reality as I see it. I am the one looking out at the world (including that part of the world inside my head). The loss of this perspective is not comparable with the loss of other consciousnesses - not from my point of view.

Naturally, your death is significantly more impactful to you than my death is to you, just as mine is to me. It holds true for each individual that their own death is the worst thing that could happen to them. My death is not comparable to the death of anyone else from my perspective. And my perspective is the only one I can possess, as it wouldn't be my perspective if it weren't the one I have. I can adopt another perspective - that of another person or of "nature" as a whole - in a sense, but in doing so, I am merely suppressing thoughts about what I truly am and about the reality of my perspective to gather more information about the world.

Self-deception about the nature of death

I suspect that the deathist, when discussing or contemplating death, adopts these alien perspectives as a defense mechanism. It serves as a defense against confronting the true nature of death. The brain mechanisms and sub-systems that automatically mislead us about the actual nature and malevolence of death might have served a useful and merciful function throughout most of human history. Until recently, there was no rational hope of avoiding death (I do not consider religious views of life after death to be rational), so we might consider this death blindness as beneficial for the well-being of past people. I strongly doubt the truth of this, but I won't discuss it in this article. Whatever its historical truth, the death-blindness, the deathist view, is now harmful. Presently, it's becoming increasingly difficult to avoid the realization that religion is nonsense and that death signifies the end.

Simultaneously, we now have the opportunity to ultimately defeat death, to annihilate the annihilator. It's time to cast aside our self-imposed blinders, to recognize death for what it is, and to join in the quest to confront and deal with it mercilessly. Now is the time to advocate for life extension research, hoping that aging processes will be comprehended and manageable before we're at high risk. Now is the time to make arrangements for cryonic suspension—the only practical way to evade death in the event it arrives before science conquers it. In the decades ahead, we might have the chance to avoid death resulting from the complete accidental destruction of the biological vessel of consciousness. This might be possible through simultaneous existence as programs in many computer-minds or by reactivating recently stored backup copies of the self. Death is no longer certain. For each of us, whether or not we die might now be largely a matter of choice. Deathism will hinder us from acknowledging these possibilities. Deathism is a lethal belief system.

But it's natural

I'm astounded that so many people, including otherwise intelligent individuals, defend death on the grounds that it's natural. The term "natural" is not entirely clear in its meaning(2), but here, I'll consider it to mean "without intelligent alteration in the course of events." This argument against using human intelligence and technology to eliminate death due to aging and natural causes appears to involve the equation: natural = good. Without delving into an extensive discussion about the meaning of goodness, let's examine if this equation seems reasonable. What can we think of that is natural?

Killing animals for food is natural.
Suffering injuries is natural.
Suffering unrelieved pain is natural.
Using violence to obtain what you desire is natural.
Heart disease is natural.
Diseases are natural.
Ignorance is natural.
Starvation is natural.
Fear of the unknown is natural.
Sunburn is natural.
Gangrene is natural.

Clearly, it's irrational to believe that whatever is natural is automatically good. Often, nature presents us with a difficult situation, and only the application of human intelligence can alleviate the problem. Nature is indifferent and doesn't concern itself with human interests. If we wish to take control, we frequently need to rebel against our natural circumstances.

Death is natural because nature had no intention of designing us for eternal life. All nature, or the part represented by our genes, cares about is reproduction. Our bodies are gene machines, created to propagate DNA. This objective doesn't necessitate long-lived bodies; in fact, it seems more effective to create disposable bodies that reproduce quickly. However, our interests do not align with those of nature. Our interests can only be fulfilled by overcoming natural death. To reject this based on the grounds of naturalness is an act of cowardice: it's agreeing to serve as a willing subject to the whims of a senseless ruler.

Death and the meaning of life

Even more incredible to me than the idea that one's own death is not bad because it is natural, is the idea that death is necessary to give meaning to life. This view is defended by Bernard Williams in the arch-deathist article “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality”(3),(4). I suspect that Williams rationalized his position as follows: He realized he was going to die and, on some level, recognized that this was a very negative prospect for him. Since he couldn't believe in the empty promises made by religions and yet didn't want to confront death directly, he felt he had to conclude that life would be meaningless because it would end. Unwilling to accept that life was devoid of meaning, he forced himself to conclude that life is meaningful only because it is finite.

The two mistakes here are, firstly, moving from the fact of death to the conclusion that life has no meaning, and secondly, assuming that life is meaningless without a specified limit. Life gains meaning and value from an individual's set of projects, goals, and activities. We each assign meaning and value to our lives through our chosen concerns, beliefs, and activities. Death halts any further activities and likely thwarts the fulfillment of some of one's goals. Being dead signifies the end of the value and meaning of one's life, except to the extent that these values are maintained by others - yet this becomes an aspect of their lives, not the deceased person's.

Since after one is dead, one no longer has a life, it's clear that one’s life cannot possess meaning or value after death. But why should anyone conclude from this that their life has no meaning now? The fact that the value and meaning of one's life will eventually cease does not imply that it lacks meaning and value while one is alive. Death is a dreadful event because it marks the end of your universe, experiences, and all future possibilities for you. However, these facts don't negate the joys and rewards of life as they exist in the present, though the awareness of its eventual end might somewhat diminish that joy, knowing it will come to a close.

Regarding Williams' view that life is meaningless unless it has a definite limit, this incredible perspective appears to be, as suggested earlier, a substantial rationalization. The notion seems to revolve around the belief that our lives progress through distinct stages such as infancy, childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and old age. We adapt our activities and structure our lives to fit into the roles expected during each of these phases. Williams seems to assume that immortals would drift along, feeling they lack defined roles and activities, leading to boredom and stagnation. This view appears to originate from a narrow imagination or a lack of creativity.

Firstly, there is no necessity to reach decrepit old age to maintain interest in our lives. Old age often brings challenges that can diminish the enjoyment of life, though many physically frail individuals maintain a zest for life. Secondly, "adulthood" is not a single stage where stagnation must occur. Even if an immortal were to exhaust their current interests, they could explore new pursuits endlessly. A philosopher, for instance, might spend decades or centuries learning various subjects or arts - history, economics, political theory, sciences, music, writing, art, and more.

The immortal could delve into wealth acquisition, constructing buildings, cities, space colonies, or even entire planets. By the time they've mastered any of these, new areas of study and activities will have emerged. Advancements in technology would enable continual self-improvement, leading them on a path from being human to becoming more godlike over time. They would encounter new cultures, form relationships, love, and continuously expand their horizons, meeting new people and exploring new opportunities.

There's no chance for them to exhaust possibilities, as options would continuously expand faster than they could explore them. Moreover, immortals wouldn't slow down, nor would they assume they could indefinitely postpone anything, given that environments change, unique opportunities arise from specific circumstances, and some chances may never repeat themselves.

The source of motivation

A common argument used to assert that death doesn't matter is that death won't matter to us when we're dead, so it shouldn't matter to us now. This argument involves a significant logical leap. Certainly, death won't matter to us when we're dead because, for a simple reason, we won't exist. It's misleading to discuss things not mattering to someone who's dead because there won't be any "me" to refer to. While I am alive, however, the situation is entirely different as I do exist, and things can matter to me. Specifically, my death matters to me as it signifies the destruction of my subjective universe, the impending end of all my aspirations, dreams, plans, connections, relationships, experiences, and possibilities. I cannot fathom what it will be like for me to be dead because there will be no experience to perceive. But once again, the fact that I won't be upset about being dead is irrelevant to whether impending death should concern me now, for after death, the person ceases to exist to feel any form of upset.

Not every living being has a reason to live. The reason to live arises from possessing goals and values that require time for fulfillment. If an organism lacks goals or values, it might have no reason to live, but this circumstance applies to very few of us! Possessing any goals logically implies the desire for more life to achieve those goals. The absence of goals after death is irrelevant to the reason for living while alive. As long as one is alive, there exists a reason to continue. The more goals, plans, and values one has yet to realize in life, the more reason one has to live. Individuals who commit suicide or waste away typically have lost interest in life due to some neurotic process. There is always plenty to do - only neurosis might lead one to forget that. Although plans might fail occasionally, a healthy mind dismisses these failures, perseveres, or sets new goals. Extropians, with a multitude of diverse goals and deeply held values centered on expansion, improvement, and self-development, possess a profoundly strong will to live. That's why we are immortalists, rather than just people aiming to live a healthy 80 years.

It appears to me that those who cannot perceive why death is a bad thing are unwell. Sickness denotes inefficiency, a failure in function. A mind is unwell when it doesn't function optimally. A healthy mind explores, craves information and ideas, and finds new perspectives and understandings profoundly appealing. Death marks the final end to all possibilities of learning, exploring, and improving. Sickness infiltrates a mind when it prefers to be content with itself, stagnates, and lets understanding slip away. An immortalist comprehends that physical death marks the end of existence, hence perceiving death as the ultimate adversary that must be evaded or eliminated by safeguarding against all potential causes of self-destruction.

I hope to have dispelled some misunderstandings surrounding the nature of death and shown why we should be deeply concerned about it. If you already agreed with this perspective initially, perhaps you've gained further insight into the views of deathists and feel better equipped to dismantle them. Deathism not only threatens those who believe it but also those of us who are already immortalists. It must be challenged and eradicated to ensure our survival. The more people we can enlighten, the more lives will be saved from the abyss of death.

notes

1)See the excellent discussion in Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, (Oxford University Press, 1984). 2)l intend to deal with the issue of natural/unnatural in the next issue, from a variety of angles. The “it's not natural" argument (if it can be called that) is used to promote entropy in may contexts. 3)Bernard Williams, ‘The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality", in Problems of the Self, (Cambridge University Press, 1973). 4)For a philosopher with a much healthier attitude, see Thomas Nagel, The Subjective View, (Oxford University Press, 1986), pp 223-231. Nagel says ",..given the simple choice between living for another week and dying in five minutes l would always choose to live for another week; and by a version of mathematical induction l conclude that l would be glad to live forever. Perhaps l shall eventually tire of life, but at the moment l can't imagine it, nor can l understand those many distinguished and otherwise reasonable persons who sincerely assert that they don't regard their own mortality as a misfortune.” Of Williams he asks, "Can it be that he is more easily bored than l ?".