MORALITY OR REALITY

 By Max T. O'Connor [Editor: This article is reprinted from Extropy #1 , 1989 . Extropy was published by The Extropy Institute] 

"There are no moral phenomena at all, only a moral interpretation of phenomena." Friedrich Nietzsche, "Beyond Good and Evil."

 I am going to argue that not only do we have good reasons to reject morality, but an amoralist viewpoint is especially fitting for Extropians. Don't be put off by the seemingly radical nature of my thesis - you may end up finding it not only convincing but also attractive and liberating! To begin, I will explain why I have come to dislike morality. Then, I will provide what I believe are solid theoretical reasons for rejecting any objectivist view of ethics (that is, any view stating that morals are objectively right or wrong, or actions objectively good or bad). Lastly, I will conclude the main part of the paper by moving beyond subjectivist ethics to an amoralist position.

The Faults of Moralities Apart from the fact (as argued below) that moralities have no basis in reality, there are at least four objectionable features of moralities. Firstly, they are almost universally harmful to human happiness; secondly, they falsify one’s perception of reality; thirdly, they frequently stand in the way of new ideas and new technologies; and fourthly, moralities result in wars, oppression, maliciousness, violence, emotional suffering, and many other stupidities. I will only sketch my reasoning here since these are not my major theoretical points, and a full argument for these views would require much space. My main reason for explaining these four items is to make evident the motivation for this article and its place in Extropy.

(1)It should be clear that many moral systems have deleterious effects on human happiness. Traditional religious moralities, such as those of Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism, have little concern for happiness, pleasure, or worldly success. They are more concerned with forcing the follower to obey God's will - as represented by his agents on Earth, of course. These moralities can have devastating emotional effects, especially when they include notions of original sin, eternal punishment, guilt for wrong thoughts and feelings (which are largely involuntary), and a downgrading of the proper role of reason and evidence in our lives.

Such religions often declare that sex is evil, that enjoyment is sinful or at least very suspicious, and that life is about service to God and not about happy, successful living here and now. More modern moral systems, such as utilitarianism (which tells one to maximize the total pleasure or satisfaction in society), are more oriented towards producing happiness. Yet, they still demand that the individual sacrifice him- or herself whenever this is necessary according to the morality.

(2)Moralities falsify one's perception of reality by forcing one's thinking into an artificial and abstract framework that is not derived from considerations of the nature of the empirical world and the psychology of human beings. While some ethical systems, such as those of Aristotle, David Hume, and Ayn Rand, attempt to base themselves on human nature and the conditions of the actual world, even these systems, despite their superiority to the Kantian approach, still invoke fixed categories and establish hard principles. This tendency often leads individuals to deny facts in order to align with their preconceptions. A clear example of this trend is evident in the bizarre behavior and reasoning of many followers of Ayn Rand's "Objectivism," despite it being the most self-consciously reality-bound moral system around.

(3)Given the previous point, it's not surprising to see the typically constraining effect that moralities have had throughout history on the invention, propagation, use, and acceptance of new ideas and new technologies. Consider the opposition of Christian moralists to the use of anaesthetics, which caused so much unnecessary suffering in the nineteenth century. Also, consider the opposition to surrogate parenting—a practice that offers clear gains to human happiness—and to biotechnology and genetic engineering.

It's not just conservatives who use their morality to suppress experimentation and innovation; so-called liberals also aim to control, regulate, and often discourage the introduction of new drugs, ideas, and technologies. One of the latest attacks on progress has been the assault on cryonics, coupled with ridiculous moral accusations. Some people are determined to stop space exploration on the grounds that we have a duty to devote ourselves to the worst-off on Earth first (explaining why this is a bad idea deserves an article in itself).

(4)Wars have many causes, but one very important factor is the blindness to reality caused by moral systems. Throughout the world, you can find people fighting over differences in their religions and ways of life. Nazi Germany was the end product of a long history of moral and metaphysical philosophy, starting with Plato and including Hegel, Kant, and Marx. It was due to certain moral ideas about the necessity of promoting the Race at the expense of non-Aryans that Hitler and his gang invaded other countries, making the choice of war or surrender to oppression necessary.

People will do all kinds of stupid and malicious things if they believe that what they are doing is morally required of them. This may mean killing or torturing the infidel, burning books, restricting access to certain types of information, subjecting themselves and others to negative emotions, or simply wasting time and resources in pursuing pointless aims that have no basis outside an artificial moral system.

Why There Is No Objective Morality

In discussing the lack of objective morality, I aim to clarify this concept, differentiate various moral perspectives, highlight their flaws, and present reasons why no morality can assert objective validity. When I refer to 'objective morality,' I mean the belief in a singular set of moral principles that are unequivocally correct, akin to scientific truths. Advocates of objective ethics contend that specific values and principles can be definitively proven, unaffected by personal preferences or opinions. For instance, a proponent of objective morality might assert that having an abortion is objectively immoral, and anyone holding a contrary view is simply incorrect.

There exist different ethical theories, each striving to substantiate their alleged objectivity. I will examine consequentialist (teleological), formalist (deontological), and religious moralities, which often align with either consequentialist or formalist structures.

Religious moralities seek to ground their concepts of good and bad, right and wrong, in the will of God. The premise is that actions are good if endorsed by God and bad if forbidden by God. However, this proposition trivializes God's goodness by reducing it to mere self-approval. Moreover, as J.L. Mackie argues in 'Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong' (Penguin Books, 1977), it implies that adherence to moral rules is merely prudent, amounting to servile compliance with the arbitrary demands of a capricious tyrant. Consequently, many religious thinkers, notably St. Thomas Aquinas, have abandoned this notion and assert that morality has a foundation independent of God. However, this shift necessitates an explanation of the exact basis of morality.

Ethical frameworks, whether tied to a religion or not, may be rooted in formalist approaches like that of Immanuel Kant. These approaches often delve into complex reasoning in an attempt to establish a foundation for moral judgments. Formalist moralities, as their name suggests, establish a set of rules applicable in all situations. These rules stem from abstract considerations and lack any real connection with individual desires, preferences, or commitments. Adhering to formalist ethics demands sacrificing personal desires, values, and plans to comply with these dictates.

I have found no argument in favor of formalist ethics that I consider remotely convincing (unlike consequentialist ethics, where I find some merit, though I won't delve into those arguments here). My general criticisms of objectivism will suffice below. I highly recommend Ayn Rand's book 'Philosophy: Who Needs It' for her treatment of the absurdity and evasion of reality present in such theories.

Consequentialist or naturalist approaches aimed at objectively grounding ethics are universal failures. These theories typically define the good as something to be maximized—such as total human happiness, preferences, or the minimization of suffering. They might propose that we act in accordance with 'our nature,' as Aristotle suggested, meaning exercising one's talents and rationality. While naturalistic and consequentialist ethics show more ties to reality compared to formalist theories, they still fall short of objectively grounding ethics.

For instance, utilitarian calculations of consequences compel us to examine the real world with more care rather than merely adhering to a set of abstract principles. However, no theory of this form can successfully ground ethics objectively. This idea was elucidated by the eminent 18th-century Scottish philosopher David Hume when he showcased the fundamental distinction between facts and values. Regardless of the facts presented, there exists no logical compulsion that forces someone to determine something as objectively good or bad.

For example, it's a fact that a person suffers when I hurt them, but there's nothing inherent in that fact that compels me to judge the infliction of pain as morally wrong rather than morally neutral or even right. Rather than delving into a detailed exploration of Hume's point, I'll proceed to present general critical arguments against the possibility of any ethical system—be it formal or consequentialist—being susceptible to objective grounding.

The Arguments From Oddness and Relativity

The argument from oddness and relativity stems from the observable variations in moral codes across different ages, societies, cultural groups, and even among individuals within a society. While these variations don't inherently confirm the relativity of moral values, the widespread differences in moral beliefs make it challenging to seriously consider the idea that people are simply perceiving moral truths in a vague or confused manner.

Scientific frontiers often experience disagreement, given that new scientific territories involve speculative theoretical conjectures and inferences based on limited evidence and testing. However, moral theorizing has existed for millennia. It's improbable that more evidence could emerge to decisively settle these value-based issues. Instead, moral disagreements seem to stem not from inadequate perceptions of an objective realm of values but rather from the absorption of cultural norms.

For instance, the perception that monogamy is morally right often arises because individuals are raised within a culture that upholds monogamous relationships. Although there are moral reformers and dissenters, their views can often be best understood as a belief that the new perspective aligns more consistently with existing ethical conceptions.

The argument from oddness carries more weight than the argument from relativity and encompasses both an epistemological and a metaphysical dimension. In philosophical terms, metaphysical concerns the study of what exists and in what manner, while epistemology pertains to how we know what exists and the conditions for knowledge or rational belief.

Metaphysically, the concept of objective values would be peculiar because they would represent entities, relations, or qualities that differ substantially from anything else we encounter. This poses a challenge as it would necessitate unconventional and perplexing means of apprehending these objective values. To comprehend objective values, we would need an exceptional faculty of knowledge distinct from our typical reliance on the senses, reason, and logic that we employ for other aspects of understanding. Despite many objectivist moralists disfavoring G.E. Moore's notions of "non-natural qualities" and "faculty of moral intuition," they appear to be inadvertently committed to these concepts for any coherent understanding of objective morality.

Plato's theory of Forms illustrates the kind of construct needed for an objective ethics. The knowledge of the Form of the Good not only guides those who understand it toward the pursuit of good but also compels them to pursue it. Objective goodness would be something inherently promoted once recognized, not driven by someone's wants or desires associated with that goodness. The peculiarity of these objective values becomes apparent when pondering their connection to any natural object possessing that goodness. How precisely is an action causing unnecessary pain inherently "wrong"? There seems to be no logical link, nor do we perceive something identifiable as the property of goodness and its correlation to the action. Yet, there is supposed to exist some form of connection between them. It's more coherent to dispense with objective moral values and instead adopt subjective responses linked to individuals noticing certain action or situational features.

Several reasons prompt people to objectify their subjective values, although delving into those reasons isn't necessary here. Let's acknowledge the fact that values are rooted in individuals - moral values are essentially the desires and preferences of people, whether they consciously recognize this or not. This leads us to a conclusion of moral subjectivism. However, I lack strong arguments that can convincingly compel anyone to move beyond subjectivism to amoralism; my arguments might resonate only with those who share similar subjective values. From the outset of this article, it's evident that I value liberty, peace, opportunity, diversity, increased information, and rationality. If you also hold these values, then amoralism might appeal to you.

Amoralism doesn't negate the existence of (subjective) moralities; rather, it's an attitude towards all moral systems, stating: "No thanks!" It's important to clarify that an amoralist doesn't reject all principles of personal conduct. It's not an ideology advocating "Do whatever you feel like at any time," which is closer to behavioral nihilism. Additionally, amoralism isn't synonymous with egoism, whether narrow, broad, enlightened, or Aristotelian. Egoism itself is a moral system that imposes strict behavioral restrictions. For a detailed exposition of egoistic ethics (claiming objectivity), refer to Ayn Rand's "The Virtue of Selfishness."

Though I've long leaned toward a form of egoism and found it aligns well with my preferences and projects, I now recognize that there's no more reason to embrace an egoistic ethic than any other if it doesn't fit one's overall set of values, goals, desires, preferences, and projects. Despite this, egoism currently resonates with my preferences and projects. However, it's vital to acknowledge the inherent risk in any moral system, subjective or not. Should my fundamental preferences shift, egoism might hinder rather than aid my pursuits. If fundamentally, one doesn't wish to act egoistically, there's no compulsion to do so. While I could highlight potential consequences like death or physical/emotional pain stemming from deviating from egoism, these points would only hold sway for someone who already values those aspects.

Amoralism allows one to establish principles regulating personal conduct that can be as simple or as intricate as desired. An amoralist will find it beneficial to survey the multitude of moral systems devised (appropriately termed!) over the centuries and cherry-pick elements as they see fit. The challenge in blending moral systems arises when merging internally consistent yet mutually contradictory systems, resulting in a self-contradictory system that isn't very practical. Aside from this consideration, it's sensible to construct a system that best mirrors your values. The amoralist always keeps their system open for future revisions and adjustments as they inevitably evolve. A set of principles governing behavior is only useful if it facilitates day-to-day decision-making. You wouldn't want to derive actions from first principles every time – having a set of principles allows for maximizing efficiency in pursuing and realizing subjective values and preferences.

An amoralist is unlikely to endorse guilt as a component of their system. Guilt, as a self-punishing emotional response based on the belief of doing something "bad," is counterproductive and unpleasant, rendering one vulnerable to manipulation (a reason why Christianity encourages it). The amoralist is inclined to reject guilt, favoring remorse instead. Remorse contains no self-hate or self-pity; it is an acknowledgment that one acted contrary to more important values and preferences, whether by mistake or due to weakness of will. It involves a willingness to make amends and prevent recurrence of the mistaken behavior. Unlike guilt, remorse serves as a regulator of behavior, aligning actions with one's deepest desires.

Amoralism is a viewpoint that is gaining relevance. Traditional moralities have spawned countless miseries for individuals and societies. Even subjective moralities pose a threat by potentially steering the rapidly advancing and immensely powerful new technologies in a destructive direction or impeding their progress. Given my strong interest in expediting the development of these technologies without distortion from moral frameworks oblivious to reality, promoting amoralism, delineating its advantages, and debunking the myth of morality are among my values. I hope you will join me in eschewing morality in favor of reality.

"The learned judge correctly that people of all ages have believed that they KNOW what is good or evil, praise- and blameworthy. But it is a prejudice of the learned that WE KNOW BETTER than any other age." _ Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak.

POSTSCRIPT TO 'MORALITY OR REALITY’

[Editor: This article is reprinted from Extropy #4, Summer Issue , 1989 . Extropy was published by The Extropy Institute] 

In my article "Morality or Reality?" featured in Extropy #1, I argued against morality by highlighting its adverse effects from the standpoint of my values, which are likely shared by many other extropians. I explained how moral systems restrict our freedom without being founded on anything demonstrably rational. This is particularly evident in "objective" moralities that claim universal truth. I asserted that even when a moral system is accepted as a subjective construct, it imposes arbitrary constraints. In this postscript, I aim to elucidate my argument by exploring different meanings of the term 'moral'. I will conclude that in certain senses of morality, there exists a rational foundation, especially in moral rules governing interpersonal actions rather than self-regarding conduct.

I maintain the stance that moral systems establishing rules without consideration for individuals' actual desires, wants, and needs should be rejected on rational grounds. There is no inherent motivation to adhere to such rules except through fear and unreasoned indoctrination. This requires clarification because it might seem that moralities such as Kantianism and utilitarianism, in some way, reference human desires. For instance, Kant introduces the Categorical Imperative, which employs our desires as a basis for deriving moral principles. This Imperative asserts, "Act so that the maxim [principle] of your action can be willed at the same time to be a universal law."

Without delving into an in-depth analysis of Kant's theory here, the Imperative essentially prompts individuals to (a) identify the principle guiding their action, and (b) question whether this principle could serve as a universal law. The second test (b) involves two inquiries: (1) Can you conceive of a world in which everyone acts based on this maxim? (2) If so, would such a world be desirable?

The objections to Kant's theory are twofold. Firstly, it's practically impossible to apply. What principle guides my action if I decide to shout at someone? Is it because unreasonable people should be shouted at? Or venting angry feelings? Or expressing justified anger if it might be useful? The action aligns with an indefinite number of principles, rendering Kant's theory devoid of practical guidance. Secondly, why should I universalize my principle? Most people have different preferences and desires from mine. What relevance does it hold, even if I could establish the effects, that I wouldn't like the outcome if everyone acted similarly? Others won't act similarly as they are not me.

Now, shifting to utilitarianism as a sample consequentialist theory—where the good is happiness or pleasure, and right action entails maximizing total happiness—there are numerous problems. The fundamental question arises: why should one be moral under utilitarianism? What if I prioritize values other than happiness or pleasure? Suppose I prioritize my happiness over others', or occasionally value others' happiness but not at the expense of my own values or goals.

This lack of motivation appears to plague all moral theories that claim universality. Alan Altruist might prioritize the maximization of total happiness as his fundamental value, adhering to utilitarianism accordingly. However, this compliance stems from his pre-existing values. For Ellen Egoist, Edward Extropist, or William Wisdomist, Alan's "theory" would hold no relevance. The core issue with supposedly objectively true moral theories is their inability to answer the question, "Why be moral?" Since moral systems encapsulate a set of values that do not align with mine, I lack a reason to act on those systems. What I have reason to do depends on the values I happen to possess. In an extended sense, I might also have a reason to do something, even if I don't want to do it, if doing so advances the values I hold. I'll return to this point shortly.

What about accepting a morality as a guide to action without claiming any objective truth for it? You might decide to act according to moral system M but not assert that others have reason to do the same. I have fewer objections to this, but the same arguments apply to a lesser degree. Presumably, you choose system M because it appears to formalize the values you actually hold. You adhere to M because having a moral system makes it easier to recall the appropriate action based on the values you possess, particularly in situations where time for deliberation is limited. However, if you truly see M as a system, it may steer you into actions that are no longer rational as your values evolve over time. By "rational," I mean actions that best promote your values, whatever they might be.

The amoralist rejects systems on these grounds. The subjectivist has a valid point when arguing that having pre-established principles for quick application is helpful. The amoralist acknowledges this by having a set of well-considered principles for action, yet avoids the notion that these principles do or must form a coherent system. They are principles that need to be weighed against each other and are subject to change over time. Protecting these principles from revision by enclosing them in a system undermines the purpose of having rules—to act effectively based on one's current values.

RATIONAL MORAL RESTRICTIONS

I've suggested that in some contexts of 'morality,' it might be rational to embrace a moral code that restricts the pursuit of personal values. Two interconnected areas might substantiate this notion. The first involves personal choices with negligible direct impact on others, like choosing an occupation or deciding what to eat for dinner. In such cases, absent specific information, there's no rational reason why you shouldn't act based on your preferences. If you desire Thai food, then you have reason to eat Thai food.

However, when actions significantly affect others, some principles may limit your actions, and it might be rational to abide by them, provided doing so serves your own goals more effectively. These principles primarily revolve around people's rights against one another. While I won't delve into a comprehensive discussion of rights theory here (for further exploration, Jan Narveson's "The Libertarian Idea" and David Gauthier's "Morals By Agreement" are recommended), I aim to highlight an area where it's rational to accept limitations on one's actions.

I believe it's rational to develop a disposition to respect negative libertarian rights—rights against interference with persons and their private property. Narveson's book elaborates on these rights and their justifications. The crucial point is that by nurturing a disposition to respect rights in oneself and others, we collectively enhance our ability to pursue our goals and live as we desire. In a society where people can engage without fear of assault, theft, or fraud, individuals can redirect resources otherwise spent on protection, enabling substantial gains from cooperation. Not all such principles will necessarily hold the status of rights (enforceable claims). Still, a predisposition to honor promises or be honest may be deemed rational, even in the absence of prior desires for them.

There exist rational limitations on our behavior. Besides the principles necessary for effective social interaction, we can develop personal guidelines to navigate toward our genuine goals and resist immediate temptations. But is this morality? Partly, this question is about terminology, which isn't trivial since the words we choose shape our conceptual landscape and can wield significant influence.

In refusing to characterize internally generated values and principles as "morals," my aim was to distance rational behavioral constraints from externally imposed systems—such as those stemming from religion, society, or unsupported philosophies. I sought to distinguish a value system that imposes foreign control and restraint from one designed to enable complete expression of the self.

My previous comments in Extropy #1 were directed at the traditional, restrictive notion of morality—an idea often used to suppress individuality and control people for various religious and political motives. If we adopt Ayn Rand's definition of morality as a code of values guiding one's actions, then what I propose could indeed be considered morality, aimed at maximizing self-expression within the context of our human nature and the world around us.

On this view, certain traits like rationality and integrity may hold value for all individuals given fundamental choices, such as the decision to live and pursue happiness. Instead of labeling it "amoralism," I'll henceforth refer to it as "autonomous morality" or "personal morality." This preserves the connection with what most people typically associate with morality, facilitating better communication and dissemination of these ideas. Although part of me finds the radical suggestion of discarding morality appealing, my larger concern for clarity and effective communication now favors retaining the term 'morality,' albeit in a different sense.